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"All I know is that I know nothing. '
I. Introduction
Modern American culture is entrenched in the darkness of
heteronormativity. Heteronormativity posits that two discrete categories of
gender and sexual orientation exist: male and female, and gay and straight,
respectively. Popular belief in these categories coupled with
heteronormativity's self-sustaining social impression-that "straight" is
connected with notions of truth and morality, and "gay" with the conceptual
leftovers of falsity and deviance-transcends the mere bifurcation of sexual
orientation. Heteronormativity brands itself on the social consciousness'
notions of morality and truth which subsequently affects various social
spheres. The law, an area that ideally should be just and unbiased, is far
from an exception.
Critical inspection of various fields of sexual orientation law reveals
the use of binaries-legal constructs that courts use to categorize, then grant
or deny sexual minorities legal rights. This Note's main goal is to critically
inspect the conceptual and philosophical foundations of binary-driven
* J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, May 2008; B.A., University of
California, Los Angeles, 2005. My special thanks to Professor T.P. Gallanis for his
feedback on this Note, and to Professors Neville Cox and Courtney Cahill for giving me the
jurisprudential foundations for writing on this topic.
1. See DIOGENES LAERTIJS, THE LIVES AND OPINIONS OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS,
(C.D. Yonge trans., George Bell & Sons 1891) (attributing the quote to Socrates).
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reasoning and to determine how courts use it as a basis for granting or
denying sexual minorities civil rights in various areas of law, such as in due
process and equal protection jurisprudence.2 Part II of this Note will briefly
describe binaries, then discuss their philosophical foundations and their
effect on how concepts are defined. Part IH will briefly discuss three
particular but interrelated binaries-status/conduct, sex/gender, and
immutable/mutable-and their impact on legal outcomes. Part IV will set
forth various considerations as to why binary-fueled reasoning is
inappropriate in legal theory.
More specifically, Part IV first focuses on arguments stemming from
conventional thought, modem scientific evidence, legal analysis, and
philosophy that rebut the notion that sexual orientation is mutable conduct.
The philosophy concentrated on within this section will be Judith Butler's
feminist critique of the sex/gender binary. Ultimately, I will conclude that
there is no true answer to the question of whether sexual orientation is
immutable status or mutable conduct. Second, and in connection with the
first part, I will argue that any answer to the classification of sexual
orientation, because of its unanswerable nature, must have been decided
from premises created by a subjective standpoint. The premises that
underpin and shape binaries formed from a subjective judgment are fueled
by heteronormative bias that shape and determine how sexual orientation
will be classified. Finally, Part IV will argue that conduct itself can never
truly be deemed mutable or immutable. Arguments stemming from critical
inspection of bisexual desire and Humean ethics both show the possibility
of classifying conduct as immutable.
In conclusion, this Note does not seek to characterize sexual
orientation as status in order, for example, to gamer sexual minorities the
same protections as other statuses, such as race. This Note is not even an
argument that sexual minorities should receive any additional rights or
judicial protections. Rather, this Note is a refutation of the justifications
and methods used to deny sexual minorities rights by highlighting
arguments against current classifications of sexual orientation as conduct
and dismantling the discrete categories these binaries purport to represent.
These arguments then lend themselves to showing that subsequent use of
binaries is epistemically incoherent and ultimately reflects heteronormative
bias. Judges should not be in the practice of imposing their personal views
on whether some of the most intimate aspects of a person's life are a
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (containing the due process and equal protection
guarantees of the Constitution).
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constituent part of personal identity. Rather, courts should recognize that
the line between status and conduct is fundamentally unknowable and adopt
neutral methods for deciding whether sexual minorities, as citizens, should
be granted or denied the same constitutional rights as other groups of
people.
II. Basic Understandings: What Is a Binary?
Binaries are categorization schemes made up of two opposing
elements. Truth/falsity, right/wrong, and just/unjust are examples of
binaries that seem to stem from a human tendency to bifurcate concepts into
positive and negative terms. This tendency can be seen prominently and, as
this Note argues, stems from Socratic and Platonic philosophy.
Socrates' dialogues are generally described as an attempt to
characterize some concept. The definition of a concept is discussed in
positive and negative terms. For example, in Crito,3 Socrates distinguishes
between the just and the unjust. In Euthyphro,4 Socrates attempts to define
piety and impiety. In Charmides,5 Socrates seeks to define temperance and
its negative. In The Republic,6 Plato contemplates the definition of justice,
beauty, courage, and other concepts, as well as their negatives.
A key corollary to each attempt to define a concept is the Socratic
understanding that "Forms" exist. Forms symbolize the truth or the true
definition of something.7 Plato espoused that Forms existed in another
world, beyond human reach, and that objects and concepts in the human
world were imitations of these Forms that could only strive to be the perfect
representation of their respective Form.8 For example, a table can only
3. PLATO, CRrro (G.P. Goold trans., Harvard University Press 1977).
4. PLATO, EUTHYPRO (G.P. Goold trans., Harvard University Press 1977).
5. PLATO, CHARMIDES (G.P. Goold trans., Harvard University Press 1977).
6. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (S. Halliwell trans., Avis & Phillips Ltd. 1993) [hereinafter
REPUBLIC].
7. See id. at BOOK VI ("And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of
other things to which the term 'many' is applied there is an absolute; for they may be
brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each."); see also PLATO, PHAEDO
(G.P. Goold trans., Harvard University Press 1977) [hereinafter PHAEDO] ("But what would
you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other material equals? And what is the
impression produced by them? Are they equals in the same sense as absolute equality? Or
do they fall short of this in a measure?" (emphasis added)); id. (describing forms as "that
idea or essence, which in the dialectical process we define as essence of true existence")
8. See REPUBLIC, supra note 6, at BOOK VI, VII (relating the Allegory of the Cave, in
which the author clarifies his theory of knowledge and Forms). The allegory relates the
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strive to be the true Form of "Table" through imitation of the Form, and in
whatever way it is deficient, it lacks some truth. From this philosophy
stems a division between truth and falsity and the belief that the positive
side of some concept is a virtue, a good insofar as it strives to mimic the
truth, while the other negative side is a lacking of the truth, or true Form of
the object/concept.
The impact that Socrates' dialogues have had on the history of
philosophy, particularly metaphysics and epistemology, and the history of
human understanding is indisputable.9 However, the implication from these
early philosophic dialogues goes beyond the belief that concepts can be
story of a man trapped in a cave, forced to stare at a wall filled with shadows and form
knowledge of the world by interpreting the shadows. Id. "The many, as we say, are seen but
not known, and the ideas are known but not seen." Id. Eventually the man is taken out of
the cave and sees the sun and the things creating the shadows; from his ascent he
understands the "true" Form of things, and that the shadows in the darkness of the cave were
mere impressions created from those truths:
[S]uppose once more, that [the man trapped in the cave] is reluctantly dragged
up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he's forced into the presence of
the sun himself... he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of
him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another;
and he will contemplate him as he is.
Id.
See also PLATO, TIMAEuS (G.P. Goold trans., Harvard University Press 1977) (describing
Plato's theory of the creation of the universe). In Timaeus, Plato states:
What is that which always is and has no becoming; and what is that which is
always becoming and never is? The work of the creator, whenever he looks to
the unchangeable and fashions the form and nature of his work after an
unchangeable pattern, must necessarily be made fair and perfect; but when he
looks to the created only, and uses a created pattern, it is not fair or
perfect .... [I]n speaking of the copy and the original we may assume that words
are akin to the matter which they describe; when they relate to the lasting and
permanent and intelligible, they ought to be lasting and unalterable, and, as far
as their nature allows, irrefutable and immovable-nothing less. But when they
express only the copy or likeness and not the eternal things themselves, they
need only be likely and analogous to the real words.
Id.; PHAEDO, supra note 7 (affirming "that there is such a thing as equality, not of wood with
wood, or of stone with stone, but that, over and above this, there is equality in the abstract"
and that "there are two sorts of existences, one seen, the other unseen").
9. See, e.g., PETER WARNEK, DESCENT OF SOCRATES 3 (2005) ("There is no disputing
that Socrates marks a decisive turning point in Greek philosophy, and thus in Western
philosophy as a whole."); MARIO MONTUoRI, SOCRATES: PHYSIOLOGY OF A MYTH 6 (1981)
("Every period of history, every culture ... has made up its own Socrates, seeing in him
every time an ideal or a symbol as variable as are the possible interpretations."); ALBAN D.
WINSPEAR & TOM SILVERBERG, WHO WAS SOCRATES? v (1960) ("Socrates is regarded as a
thoroughly subversive influence .... Socrates has come to occupy a position in the
veneration of the ages second only, perhaps, to that of Jesus.").
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polarized into positive and negative-these works fundamentally reject
sliding scales in terms of thinking about truths; for example, the true Form
of something cannot be both just and unjust, beautiful and ugly, table and
not table. This type of philosophy is exclusive in the sense that to be the
true "Form" of something means the ability to be categorized discretely.
II. Binaries Used in Legal Rhetoric: Status/Conduct, Sex/Gender, and
Immutable/Mutable
Keeping the philosophical roots of positive and negative binary
reasoning in mind, I now endeavor to narrow the scope of this Note by
focusing on three binaries that impact gender and sexual orientation law:
status/conduct, sex/gender, and immutable/mutable.
In brief summary, courts use the status/conduct and sex/gender
binaries coupled with the immutable/mutable binary to justify granting or
withholding legal rights from lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transsexual
(LGBT) citizens.10  The binaries, their associations with the
immutable/mutable binary, and how they work in different legal areas will
be discussed in detail below.
A. Immutable Status/Mutable Conduct
Beginning with a definition of the status/conduct binary, status is
simply that which is integral to personal identity-some characteristic or
action that people cannot change or prevent. Conduct is the
performative aspect of human identity-the things that people do. The
status/conduct binary is the most general binary of the three and
separates who someone is from what they do.
Under the theory that courts can regulate conduct, courts use the
status/conduct binary to characterize human traits and actions stemming
from those traits as either protected status or proscribable conduct.'"
Early use of the status/conduct binary in such a way can be found in
10. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,
573 (9th Cir. 1990) (denying homosexuals suspect class status under the reasoning that
homosexuality is mutable conduct and does not parallel race, gender or alienage).
11. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) (quoting Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)) ("The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands
tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs."). Conduct
associated with such beliefs, however, is not beyond proscription by courts. Id. at 403.
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early Free Exercise cases, where the Supreme Court distinguished
between religious belief and religious conduct. For example, in
Reynolds v. United States,12 the Court proscribed the Mormon practice
of polygamy by reasoning that, while the law could not control a
person's beliefs, laws could proscribe conduct: "Congress was deprived
of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach
actions ....3 These first traces of the status/conduct distinction
foreshadow contemporary use of the binary. Moreover, courts have
coupled the immutable/mutable binary with the status/conduct binary,.
making status correspond to immutability and conduct correspond to
mutability. 14 For example, race is considered an immutable status, thus
racial minorities receive certain legal protections, such as heightened
scrutiny in equal protection jurisprudence. 5  Being gay, however, is
considered mutable conduct, and thus sexual minorities receive far less
legal protection. 16 Thus, the interplay of the two binaries sets up the
justification for why courts can regulate conduct, but not status.
12. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (finding constitutional a federal
law that declared bigamy committed in the territories or within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States to be a crime against the United States). In Reynolds, the Supreme Court
considered whether a statute criminalizing bigamy violated the First Amendment right to
free exercise of religion. Id. at 161. The plaintiff was a member of the Mormon Church and
argued as a defense to the statute that bigamy was an accepted doctrine within the Mormon
church. Id. The Court went through the history of legislation as applied to religion. Id. at
162-64. It also stated that polygamy has always been rejected in western society and by
common law. Id. at 164. The Court found the statute to be within the legislative power of
Congress and that to except individuals who practice polygamy as part of a religious belief
would be to add a "new element into criminal law." Id. at 166. The Court stated that "while
[laws] cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices." Id.
13. Id. at 164; see also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1890), overruled by
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (distinguishing between religious belief and
conduct to justify laws that prevented bigamists and polygamists from voting).




15. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (finding that racial bias was an
impermissible consideration for depriving a natural mother of custody of her child).
16. Compare id. at 429 ("The effects of racial prejudice, however real, cannot justify a
racial classification removing an infant child from the custody of its natural mother."), with
Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (1995) (finding that sexual orientation was an
appropriate consideration in depriving a natural mother custody over her child). Compare
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (finding that state laws that employed racial
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Modern courts use the status/conduct binary in various areas of
law concerning LGBT rights, including equal protection, substantive
due process, military, and immigration jurisprudence. First, in equal
protection cases, courts characterize homosexuality as mutable
conduct, which prevents homosexuals from consideration as a suspect
class. 17  Legal recognition as a suspect class would result in a
heightened standard of review of laws that discriminate on the basis
of sexual orientation.1 8  If heightened scrutiny were applied, the
government would have to prove more than just a rational connection
between its interest and the law's discriminatory application to
survive.19  However, granting suspect classification rests on the
recognition that a group has endured a history of discrimination
based on immutable characteristics. 20  Due to courts' repeated
characterization of homosexuality as conduct that is a mutable
choice, sexual minorities fail to receive heightened scrutiny. 21  For
classifications to restrict the right to marriage violated Fourteenth Amendment due process
and equal protection rights), with Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (1971) (holding
that state laws that restricted marriage on the basis of sex/homosexuality did not violate
Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights).
17. See Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1003 (1990) ("Members of recognized suspect or quasi-suspect classes, e.g., blacks or
women, exhibit immutable characteristics, whereas homosexuality is primarily behavioral in
nature."). The Court has generally focused on several factors to define suspect classifications: (1)
immutable characteristics, (2) the visibility of the characteristic, (3) the ability of the group to
protect itself through the political process, and (4) the history of discrimination against the group.
ld; see also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) ("have... been subjected to
discrimination."); City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985)
("experienced a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment."'); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 686 (1973) (discussing factors to be considered when determining whether gender should
constitute a suspect class).
18. See Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,312 (1976) (reiterating that equal
protection analysis requires strict scrutiny review only when the classification impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or disadvantages a suspect class).
19. See U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (discussing the application
of heightened judicial scrutiny in certain cases). Two types of heightened scrutiny exist: strict
scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
357 (1978) (describing "strict scrutiny" as a two-tier test requiring a compelling state interest and
narrow tailoring); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (describing "intermediate scrutiny" as a
two-tier test requiring discriminatory treatment based on "gender [to] serve important
governmental objectives and.., be substantially related to those objectives").
20. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Ind. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir.
1990) (stating that to be suspect, homosexuals must "exhibit obvious, immutable, or
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group" and that "homosexuality is not
an immutable characteristic").
21. See Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558,578 (2003) (applying rational basis review).
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example, in Lawrence v. Texas,22 the Court applied rational
basis review to denounce Texas's anti-sodomy statute,
indicating that homosexuals still did not constitute a class
eligible for heightened scrutiny.23 Furthermore, in Romer v.
Evans,24 the Court employed rational basis review to strike
down a Colorado state constitutional amendment that
invidiously targeted homosexuals.25
Second, courts use the status/conduct binary in
substantive due process jurisprudence to define (and narrow
the scope of) fundamental rights. Generally, substantive due
process protects against laws that limit a group's ability to
exercise a fundamental right.2 6  Fundamental rights are
defined as "those fundamental liberties that are implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty . . . [and] those liberties that are
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. ,
27
22. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In Lawrence, the Court considered the validity of a Texas statute
making it a crime for two persons of the same-sex "to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct."
Id at 562. Police officers, responding to a reported weapons disturbance, entered an apartment
where the petitioner and another man were engaging in a sexual act. Id. at 563. The two men
were arrested and charged under the Texas statute for having engaged in "deviate sexual
intercourse." Id The Court analyzed the petitioners' claims under the Equal Protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and reasoned that the statutes touched on a "personal relationship"
that "is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals." lId at 564,
567. The Court stated that the statute treated homosexuals and heterosexuals differently, and also
that it imposed a stigma on individuals who violated the statute. Id. at 574-75. The Court found
that the Texas statute furthered no legitimate state interest that could justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual. ld at 578.
23. See id (Texas' anti-sodomy statute unconstitutional).
24. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). In Romer, the Court considered the validity of an amendment to
Colorado's constitution that prohibited all state and local government action designed to protect
homosexuals from discrimination. ht at 624. Homosexuals claimed that the amendment would
subject them to immediate and substantial risk of discrimination based on their sexual orientation.
Id. at 625. The State argued that the amendment put homosexuals in the same position as other
individuals because it did no more than deny them special rights. Ida at 626. The Court reasoned
that the amendment placed a "broad and undifferentiated disability" on a single group, and that its
breadth did not fit the reasons offered for the amendment. Id at 632. Thus, the Court found the
amendment lacked a rational relationship to legitimate state interests. Id
25. See id at 630-33 (concluding that an amendment that prohibited all legislative,
executive, and judicial action protecting homosexuals from discrimination in Colorado violated
the Equal Protection clause).
26. See Hatheway v. Secretary of Army, 641 F.2d 1376, 1382 n.6 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981) ("The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness.").
27. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) and Moore v. East
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Bowers v. Hardwick28 involved a substantive due process claim
in which the Court upheld a Georgia anti-sodomy statute by narrowly
framing the right at issue as the "right to engage in homosexual
sodomy. ''2 9 In narrowly defining the right as the right to homosexual
sodomy (i.e. conduct), the Court found that the right did not fall into the
definition of "fundamental right" as set out by the Court.3 °
Status/conduct can thus be used even when framing rights, to define
what is at stake as proscribable conduct. Had the Court framed the right
differently, for example as the right to engage in intimate relations,
Bowers' outcome would likely have been completely different.3'
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)). In Bowers, the Court considered the validity of a Georgia
statute criminalizing sodomy. Id at 188 n.i. More specifically, the court framed the issue as
whether the Federal Constitution "confer[ed] a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in
sodomy." Id. at 190. Hardwick, the respondent, was charged with violating the statute by
committing sodomy with another adult male in his bedroorn. Id. at 188. The Court reasoned that
criminal sodomy laws had been in effect for several hundred years and that the Court would not
take an expansive view in order to discover a new fundamental right under the Due Process
Clause. Id at 194 n.5. It also rejected the argument that homosexual conduct is protected when it
occurs in the privacy of the home and stated that not all conduct in the home is immunized from
criminal liability. Id. at 195. The Court found that there was a rational basis for the statute and
that there was no fundamental right to engage in sodomy. Id at 196.
28. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (upholding Georgia's statute criminalizing sodomy),
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
29. Id. at 191.
30. Id. Although Bowers v. Hardwick was overturned in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court
continued to frame the right at issue as the right of two consenting adults to engage in
intimate private conduct. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) ("The question
before the Court is the validity of a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the
same-sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct."). More importantly, the Court
overturned Bowers under rational basis review and failed to hold that homosexual conduct
was a fundamental right worthy of elevated scrutiny. Id.
31. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 381, 383 (1978) (framing the issue as the
right to marry and thus striking down a law that would have required prisoners with child
support obligations to acquire court permission before being allowed to get married). In
discussing the right to marry, the Court referred to Loving v. Virginia, the decision that
deemed anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional and generally discussed the right to marry
and have intimate relations: "Although Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination,
prior and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that the right to marry is of
fundamental importance for all individuals." Id. at 384 (emphasis added). The right to
marry is referred to as "the most important relation in life," and is a "part of the fundamental
'right of privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." Id. at 384
(quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) and citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 382
U.S. 479, 486 (1965)). The Court goes on to state that "[wihile the outer limits of (the right
of personal privacy] have not been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions
that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are personal
decisions relating to marriage ... [and] family relationships." Id. at 385 (quoting Carey v.
Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977)).
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Moreover, had the Bowers Court defined homosexuality as an
orientation (i.e. a status) specific to a group of people, ample grounds
would exist to find that homosexuals constitute a class of people that meet
the prerequisites for utilization of heightened scrutiny: namely, that
homosexuals are a class subject to pervasive social discrimination and
without ability to protect themselves through the political process.
32
Heightened scrutiny would likely give homosexual litigants enough
leverage to defeat laws withholding equal rights to homosexuals under the
Equal Protection and Due Process clauses. For example, in Wilson v. Ake,33
a Florida district court refused to recognize the Massachusetts union
between two women under the Federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA)3 Under rational basis review, the court noted that the United
States offered two reasons for denying the recognition of same-sex
marriage under the DOMA: first, the law promotes and "fosters the
development of relationships that are optimal for procreation"; and second,
it encourages stable relationships between biological parents optimal for
rearing children.35 These reasons probably would not have survived
intermediate scrutiny and certainly would not survive strict scrutiny. In
fact, if a court wanted to follow the steps of the Massachusetts Supreme
Court in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,36 it need not have held
that those two justifications survived even rational basis review.
32. For an example of that social discrimination and its implications, see High Tech
Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing
the Department of Defense's policy of engaging in expanded investigation into gay and
lesbian applicants for secret or top secret security clearance in order to protect national
secrets).
33. 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005). In Wilson, the court considered the
validity of a statute declaring that the state of Florida was not required to recognize and
honor a Massachusetts marriage license issued to a lesbian couple. Id. at 1301. The
plaintiffs argued that the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and the Florida statute
violated the Full Faith and Credit clause, Due Process clause, and Equal Protection clause,
among other provisions of the Constitution. Id. at 1303. The court reasoned that the Full
Faith and Credit clause does not require a state to apply another state's law in violation of its
own legitimate public policy. Id. Moreover, the court stated that, while the Supreme Court
has recognized that the right to marry is a fundamental right, it has not recognized the right
to marry someone of the same-sex as fundamental. Id. at 1306. It also stated that
homosexuals are not a suspect class, and thus, rational basis review, not strict scrutiny, is
appropriate. Id. at 1307-08. The court upheld the Florida statute and DOMA. Id. at 1309.
34. See id. at 1303 (finding a Florida statute withholding recognition of same-sex
marriages constitutional).
35. Id. at 1308.
36. See Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,969 (Mass. 2003) (finding
the prohibition on same-sex civil marriages unconstitutional under the Massachusetts
constitution). In Goodridge, the court considered the Massachusetts Department of Public
15 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 147(2008)
Third, under current military policy, the law that governs
homosexuals' ability to serve explicitly distinguishes between status and
conduct. 37  Under the Don't Ask Don't Tell (DADT) policy, military
servicemen are not punished for being homosexual as long as they do not
engage in homosexual conduct. The statute itself, however, states:
A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed
forces.., if one or more of the following findings is made... : (1)
That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited
another to engage in a homosexual act ... (2) That the member has
stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual .... 38
DADT continues by stating that servicemen who are homosexual can
continue to serve even if the above situations are found as long as they
demonstrate "that he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to
engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in
homosexual acts. 3 9  However, homosexuality is a class defined by the
sexual attraction its members have, and it seems logically incommensurate
to argue that one does not have a "propensity to engage in" conduct when
one has admitted the very foundation for engaging in that type of conduct-
same-sex attraction.
For instance, in Watson v. Cohen,4° a Navy serviceman stated "I have a
homosexual orientation." In order to rebut the presumption that
membership in the class amounts to homosexual propensity/conduct,
Health's practice of denying same-sex couples marriage licenses. Id. at 948. The plaintiffs,
homosexual couples, attempted to obtain marriage licenses, but were denied. Id. at 960.
The court reasoned that marriage confers many benefits, which touch every aspect of "life
and death." Id. at 955. The court also stated that to deny one the right to marry is to deprive
one of the full protection of the law. Id. at 957. Moreover, it stated that the Massachusetts
state constitution often affords individuals more rights than the Federal Constitution,
including more protection from unwarranted government intrusion and more opportunity to
partake in benefits. Id. at 959. The court found the prohibition violated the Massachusetts
constitution and rejected the following reasons for disallowing same-sex marriage: "(1)
providing a favorable setting for procreation; (2) ensuring a two-parent family with one
parent of each sex for child rearing; and (3) preserving state and private financial resources."
Id. at 961, 969.
37. See infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
38. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1993) (emphasis added).
39. Id. (emphasis added); see also, Richenberg v. Perry, 73 F.3d 172, 174 (1995)
("The current military policy appears to recognize, because it purports to create a
presumption, based on nothing more than honest statements, that status or desire equals
propensity to act.").
40. 124 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding DADT under rational basis review
because homosexuals do not constitute a suspect class).
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Watson submitted statements to a Navy board of review stating: "I
expressly deny that I have any intent or propensity to engage in any
[homosexual] conduct .... ,41 The Navy board of review still discharged
Watson, and the Ninth Circuit held that DADT did not violate equal
42protection. In essence, DADT purports to exclude solely on the basis of
conduct, but it effectively creates a nearly irrefutable connection between
homosexual status and homosexual conduct.43 DADT truly operates under
a collapse in the status/conduct binary and regulates both status and conduct
by forcing homosexuals to renounce their membership in the class
completely.an
Finally, immigration cases pose the opposite situation to those
described above because immigration courts use the status/conduct binary
to grant refugees the right of asylum, rather than to strip away a right.45 In
stark contrast with Article lII courts' categorization of homosexuality as
mutable conduct, immigration courts recognize homosexuality as an
immutable status worthy of protection.46 This switch poses jurisprudential
41. Id. at 1130.
42. See id. at 1136 (finding that the DADT policy fulfilled the "legitimate state
interest" and "rational relation" requirements of rational basis review).
43. See Able v. U.S., 880 F. Supp. 968, 976 (1995) (stating the difference between
status and conduct is mere "semantic gymnastics"). The court here points out that very few
cases exist in which a declaration of homosexuality did not result in discharge; three cases
that successfully rebutted the presumption involved "aberrations stemming from a
dysfunctional application of the policy" where a member stated "she thought she might be
gay" or "I'm kind of confused about my sexual preference ..... Id. See also Thorne v. U.S.
Dep't of Defense, 945 F. Supp. 924, 930 (E.D. Va. 1996) (upholding the Navy's decision to
discharge Thorne because he stated he was homosexual, an identity that indicates a
propensity to engage in homosexual conduct). The court held that declarations are
rebuttable, however, and the plaintiffs failure to rebut his statement caused his as-applied
challenge to fail. Id. at 929.
44. See Able, 880 F. Supp. at 975 (explaining such forced renouncement). The court
stated:
Although the Act and the Directives are written in such a manner as to give the
impression that there is a principled distinction between the [status and
conduct], only a brief critique will demonstrate that in practice no such
distinction exists .... [Tiestimony at the Senate hearing shows that a member
who admits to a homosexual orientation has only a 'hypothetical' chance to
escape discharge.
Id.
45. It should be noted that immigration courts are administrative courts formed under
Article I of the U.S. Constitution and are, therefore, distinct from Article Ill courts.
46. See Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 1. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (1990), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/vol20/3222.pdf (describing the immigration judge's
holding recognizing homosexuality as an immutable status).
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and epistemic problems: Namely, can a legal system honestly be coherent
or logical if it defines homosexuality as status in one context and conduct in
another? In terms of epistemics, is it coherent to have inconsistent axioms?
In Part I, this Note argues that this inconsistency indicates the inability to
objectively categorize sexual orientation as status or conduct discretely.
B. Sex/Gender
The sex/gender binary distinguishes between "sex" as one's physical
sexual attributes and "gender" as one's performance in society in
accordance with those sexual attributes.47 The sex/gender binary falls under
the status/conduct binary insofar as status is linked to the notion of one's
physical sexual attributes, and gender is linked with conduct, the
performative aspect of one's sex. Because of its connection with
status/conduct, the immutable/mutable binary also attaches to the
sex/gender binary insofar as one's sex as a status corresponds to
immutability while one's gender performance corresponds to mutability.48
However, unlike the status/conduct binary, courts collapsed the original
binary by equating the terms "sex" and "gender" to create a new sex and
gender/sexual orientation binary. This has prominently occurred in Title
VII cases, several of which are described below.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.49 Courts have
interpreted Title VIl's prohibition of sex discrimination to include gender
discrimination, thus collapsing the concepts of sex and gender (and thereby
status/conduct).5 ° For example, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,51 the
plaintiff was a woman who was harassed for being aggressive in the
workplace.52 Her male colleagues called her "macho" and suggested that
she attend "charm school., 53  Ultimately, the plaintiff argued that her
employer did not promote her to partner because she was not ladylike
47. It must be noted that different societies have different gender performances or
expressions of gender.
48. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
49. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 241, 255
(1964).
50. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (referring to sex
discrimination and gender discrimination as if they were the same term).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 235.
53. Id.
GENDER TROUBLE IN THE LAW
enough.54 The United States Supreme Court ruled that Title VII protected
against discrimination on the basis of gender, namely how feminine the
plaintiff employee acted, as part of its protection against sex
discrimination.55
To be precise, however, a difference between sex and gender does
exist. Sex typically denotes one's anatomic/chromosomal sex or one's
reproductive organs; gender denotes the social attributes that constitute a
sexual identity and is culture-specific.56 Some feminist theorists would
characterize sex as status and gender as performative conduct.
57
Why the collapse of these two terms? First, in the vernacular, sex and
gender are used interchangeably. However, this cultural phenomenon, in
itself, indicates something important: Namely, the common
interchangeable use of sex and gender indicates the conceptual difficulty in
separating discrimination based on one's sex from how one performs it. In
other words, it is the difficulty in separating who someone is (status) from
the things that they do (conduct). Anatomic sex alone is not generally
dispositive as to whether someone is socially deemed a man or a woman;
rather, people make that determination on the basis of outward appearance
and personality traits corresponding to gender norms. Second, in describing
the reach and legislative purpose of Title VII, the Court in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins stated that "Congress intended to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from gender
stereotypes. ''58 Thus, if the statute's purpose is to stop discrimination on the
basis of gender-in other words, when the discrimination arises from
belonging to or deviating from a gender stereotype-to ignore gender
would clearly be incommensurate with the purpose of the statute.
If gender performance, which is conduct, is protected under Title VII,
what about sexual orientation, which is also regarded as conduct? Sexual
54. Id.
55. Id. at 258.
56. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 735 (27th ed. 2000) (defining gender as the
"[c]ategory to which an individual is assigned by self or others, on the basis of sex. Cf. sex,
gender role" (emphasis added)); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S MEDICAL DESK DICTIONARY 299
(1996) (stating that gender is "the behavioral, cultural or psychological traits typically
associated with one sex").
57. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLES: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY 12, 26 (1990) (stating that "sex [has] come to take the place of the person, the self-
determining cogito" and that cogito becomes gendered through performance of gender
norms).
58. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (quoting Sprogis v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
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orientation simply does not reap the benefits of the collapse of the
sex/gender binary, and thus, neither does it reap the legal protections of
being considered status under the status/conduct binary. Courts have
repeatedly held that sexual orientation falls outside the realm of gender,
and, therefore, the legislature must amend Title VII to include sexual
orientation under its protection. For instance, in Dawson v. Bumble &
Bumble,59 the defendant-employer told the openly lesbian plaintiff to "act
... less like a man and more like a woman" and told her that she "needed
to have sex with a man. ' 6° Although these statements look seemingly
identical to those made to the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, the Second
Circuit denied the plaintiff relief, holding that these were instances of
sexual orientation discrimination and that claims of gender stereotyping
should not be used to "bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title
VII."61 The only fact that truly distinguishes Bumble & Bumble from Price
Waterhouse, however, is the plaintiffs lesbian orientation.
Moreover, nothing seems more inseparable from the stereotypical
concept of being female than sexual attraction to men. If courts truly desire
to protect against discrimination based on deviations from gender
stereotypes,62 surely they are excluding one of the main elements of gender
performance: sexual orientation. Thus, courts have effectively created a
status and non-sexual conduct/sexual conduct binary-in other words, sex
and gender/sexual orientation.
C. Immutable/Mutable
As discussed above, the immutable/mutable binary corresponds to
status/conduct and the new binary of sex and gender/sexual orientation.
The immutable/mutable binary seems to be the "justifying" binary insofar
as courts use it to conceptually justify why a characteristic or an action is
eligible or ineligible for legal protection. For example, in Robinson v.
California,63 the Court struck down a law that made addiction to narcotics
illegal. The Court reasoned that the law violated the Fourteenth
59. 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005).
60. Id. at 215.
61. Id. at218.
62. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (using Title VII to protect an aggressive
business woman from discrimination where aggression is considered a deviation from
female gender norms).
63. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
GENDER TROUBLE IN THE LAW
Amendment, as cruel and unusual punishment, by punishing someone for
his status as a drug addict.64 The Court found the condition of being a drug
addict a status: "To be addicted to the use of narcotics is said to be a status
or condition and not an act ... in the fact that [it] is chronic rather than
acute.
65
In terms of sex, gender, and sexual orientation, courts tie up notions of
immutability with sex and gender performance and notions of mutability
with sexual orientation. Notions of immutability and mutability provide a
jurisprudential justification for withholding protection of sexual orientation
and protecting sex and gender. Courts have never really explained why
they associate immutability with status and mutability with conduct. It
seems as if conceptually "conduct" denotes that which is willed and thus
capable of change or proscription; "Status" denotes that which is innate and
unacquired. Although, intuitively, the association seems correct, there are
strong arguments that personal identity cannot truly be separated from one's
actions. Those arguments will be taken up throughout Part IV.
66
Another important consideration that stems from this discussion, and
which will be taken up post haste, is that by defining some characteristics as
immutable status and others as mutable conduct, these binaries should be
understood as instruments used to define personal identity. When courts
invoke binaries to justify legal outcomes, they are actually deciding which
traits (or actions) are so integral to a person that they constitute an element
of personal identity.
IV. Should/Can Courts Decide What Constitutes Personal Identity?
The legal and social implications of denying rights via binaries triggers
a consideration of the propriety of allowing courts to decide what
constitutes personal identity (status). Three main points suggest the
impropriety of allowing courts to decide what constitutes status and what
constitutes conduct: first, courts cannot objectively decide what constitutes
status rather than conduct; second, various sources counter the view that
homosexuality is status-this lends to the argument that courts are
incapable of deciding what forms constitutive identity; and third, even if
one believes that homosexuality is conduct, bisexuality and philosophy
64. Id. at 667.
65. Id. at 662.
66. See discussion infra Part IV.
15 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 147 (2008)
provide theories that give reason to believe that some conduct is
immutable-this lends to debunking the immutable/mutable binary.
A. Categorizing Homosexuality as Mere Conduct Counters Conventional
Thought, Modem Scientific Evidence, Legal Thought, and Philosophy
1. Conventional Thought
Modem courts' assignment of homosexual conduct as mutable does
not parallel conventional thought. Many people believe that sexual
orientation cannot be changed 67 and that sexuality flows so innately from a
person's character that it constitutes status. Religious orientation functions
in a similar way and strongly parallels sexual orientation.68 First, neither
practicing a religion nor engaging in homosexual conduct can be deemed
pure conduct because people do not just do them. For example, being
Muslim is not just praying five times a day, or refraining from alcohol and
pork consumption, it is something constitutive in the person who practices
it. Followers of Islam, or any other sect for that matter, do not simply
perform their religion; it constitutes a part of their identity. Sexual
orientation functions in the same way; it is conduct that people partake in,
and yet somehow that conduct defines the people who partake in it.
Moreover, both religion and sexual orientation can be characterized as
mutable or voluntary conduct, but generally people cannot shed their
religion or sexual orientation like a piece of clothing. Proof of this can be
found throughout history in that people have held on to their religious
convictions and sexual orientations in the face of exile, persecution, and
genocide, including the Holocaust.69  Similarly, sexual orientation is an
integral part of identity and cannot easily, if ever, be shed. Electro-shock
67. See Ken Hausman, Furor Erupts Over Study On Sexual Orientation, 36
PsYcHnATRiC NEWS 13, 20 (2001), available at http://pn.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/
full/36/13/20 (discussing the controversy ignited in 2001 when a major proponent of
removing homosexuality from the APA's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Robert Spitzer,
M.D., announced he had clinical proof that reparative psychotherapies have, in some cases,
successfully changed homosexuals into heterosexuals).
68. See William Eskridge, A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Religion,
Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE
L.J. 2411, 2411 (1997) ("Like religion, sexual orientation marks both personal identity and
social divisions. In this century... sexual orientation has steadily been replacing religion as
the identity characteristic that is both physically invisible and morally polarizing.").
69. See Elizabeth Olson, Gay Focus at Holocaust Museum, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 4, 2003,
at B7 (discussing the persecution of homosexuals during the holocaust).
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therapy, marginalization, persecution, and genocide have proven inept at
eradicating homosexuality.7 ° Suicide rates among those who are both
religious and gay further show the impossibility, for some, of simply
changing their religion or sexual orientation.7'
2. Modem Scientific Evidence
Many scientists would agree that sexual orientation is immutable:
"[W]e know that homosexuality is 'immutable' insofar as it is highly
resistant to attempts to change it .... 7 2  That is not to say that sexual
orientation can never be changed. Some have been successful in changing
their sexual orientation. In 2003, Robert Spitzer conducted a study in
which 40% of 200 participants reported changing their sexual
orientations.73 The scientific community heavily criticized the study,
however, for being skewed by "volunteer bias" insofar as many of the
participants were highly religious (81%), members of anti-gay
organizations aimed at converting homosexuals, or suffering from extreme
depression or suicidal tendencies because of their sexual orientation
(79%).74 Those that were successful were motivated by the social stigma
that accompanies homosexuality or by religious considerations. Not all
people can change their sexual orientation, however, and the reparative
treatments used to change sexual orientation can have damaging
psychological effects.75
70. See Negar Azimi, Prisoners of Sex, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2006, § 6, at 63
(discussing homosexuality in the Arab world and the various types of treatments people are
forced to endure).
71. See Keren Skegg et al., Sexual Orientation and Self-Harm in Men and Women,
160 AM. JUR. PSYCHIATRY § 541 (2003) (discussing the link between self-harm and sexual
orientation); Hugo Salinas, A Witness Sealed with Blood: Gay Mormon Suicides and the
Politics of Silence, AFFIRMATION: GAY & LESBIAN MORMONS, Oct. 2001,
http://www.affirmation.org/suicide info/witnesssealedwithblood.shtml (last visited Dec.
18, 2008) (discussing suicide among gay Mormons) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
72. GLENN WILSON & QAZI RAwMAN, BORN GAY 148 (2005). This discussion probes
the tension between immutability on one hand and self-control on the other. It points out
that some countries use the threat of the death penalty or special drugs to deter homosexual
conduct but that "neither of these extreme measures actually alters sexual orientation-they
merely suppress its manifestation." Id.
73. Id. at 40.
74. Id.
75. See Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing the denial of
application for asylum, held that use of these therapies "torture mentally [and] physically"
15 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 147 (2008)
In 1957, the British government formed a committee of psychiatrists,
legal scholars, politicians, and religious figures to determine whether
private homosexual conduct between consenting adults (over the age of
twenty-one) should continue to be criminally punishable. The subsequent
Report of the Departmental Committee on Homosexual Offences and
Prostitution (a.k.a. the "Wolfenden Report") was released. In the report, the
committee acknowledged the difficulty, and in some cases the
impossibility, of changing homosexual identity, writing that "[o]ur evidence
leads us to the conclusion that a total reorientation from complete
homosexuality to complete heterosexuality is very unlikely indeed."76 The
report questions therapy aimed solely at complete readjustment of sexual
orientation, but emphasizes that therapy might be useful to help
homosexuals come to terms with their differences and to better adjust to
society: "A homosexual ... may be regarded as successfully treated if he is
brought to a more nearly complete adjustment with.., society .... The
object of the treatment is to relieve mental stress .... ,,77 The report also
recognizes the psychological harm that may be done to homosexuals
through such reparative therapy, and suggests that the only thing that needs
to be corrected in homosexuals is their possible maladjustment to society:
"[T]here may be good grounds, from the medical point of view, for not
attempting any fundamental reorientation of the sexual propensity of a
homosexual who is already well adjusted and is a useful member of
society.
7 8
and thus justified approving her application for asylum). In Pitcherskaia, a Russian lesbian
applied for asylum after being subjected to various conversion therapies including
electroshock therapy and sedative drugs. Id. at 644 n. 4. See also Am. Psychiatric Ass'n,
Background to COPP Position Statement on Therapies Focused on Attempts to Change
Sexual Orientation (Reparative or Conversion Therapies) Supp., May 2002,
http://www.psych.org/Departments/EDU/Library/APAOfficialDocumentsandRelated/Positio
nStatements/200001a.aspx (last visited Dec. 18, 2008) ("[A]necdotal reports of 'cures' are
counterbalanced by anecdotal claims of psychological harm.") (on file with Washington and
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
76. Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (The
Wolfenden Report) 66 (1957).
77. Id. at 66-67.
78. Id. at 67.
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3. Legal Thought
In Norris v. Attorney General,79 the Irish High Court recognized
sexual orientation as immutable when it concluded that "[t]he exclusively
homosexual orientation is congenital and not a matter of choice .... There
is not any satisfactory method of treatment to alter this exclusively
homosexual orientation, so the homosexual must live with it .... 80
Despite the recognition of immutability, the Irish court upheld the anti-
sodomy statutes for reasons of public morality rather than by the
status/conduct binary.81 Unlike the American judiciary, the Irish court
admitted that religion and morality propelled their decision.82
Moreover, in contrast with their counterpart Article III courts, United
States immigration courts dealing with asylum cases acknowledge the
immutability of sexual identity. In Matter of Toboso-Alfonso,83 the court
unequivocally stated: "[H]omosexuality is an 'immutable' characteristic."
After Toboso-Alfonso, then United States Attorney General Janet Reno
released Order 1895-94, making Toboso-Alfonso binding precedent only in
the context of immigration and asylum cases: "[A]n individual who has
been identified as homosexual and persecuted by his or her government for
79. [1984] I.R. 36 (Ir. S.C.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/EESC/
1983/3.html.
80. Id.
81. See id. (rejecting plaintiffs claims that the law cannot intrude into areas of
"private morality" and finding homosexuality objectionable for various "moral" and "public
safety" reasons including preventing the spread of disease and promoting heterosexual
marriage).
82. Compare id. ("Freedom of expression and freedom of association are not
guaranteed as absolute rights. They are protected by the Constitution subject to public order
and morality .... Homosexuality has always been condemned in Christian teaching."), with
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (denying that morality should play a role in
deciding the issue before the court). The Lawrence Court stated:
It must be acknowledged... that the Court in Bowers was making the broader
point that for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual
conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs,
conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional
family .... These considerations do not answer the question before us,
however. The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to
enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law.
'Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code.'
Id. at 571 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992)).
83. 20I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A.1990).
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that reason alone may be eligible for relief under the refugee laws on the
basis of persecution because of membership in a social group.' 84  The
contradicting characterization of homosexuality as mutable conduct in one
legal context, and immutable status in another, makes apparent the
malleability and indeterminacy surrounding the status/conduct binary.
While it is true that different jurisdictions and courts often disagree about
rules and procedure, given the gravity of rights at stake for an entire
community of people, estimated at ten percent of the population, how can
Article 11 courts seriously justify withholding people's rights based on
premises inconsistent with other courts in the United States? If
homosexuality as conduct is truly a reason to deny homosexual citizens
equal rights, to psychologically impugn them, and to discriminate against
them, it would seem a more solid foundation should exist.
4. Philosophy
The question of what constitutes personal identity has been strongly
debated throughout the history of philosophy. 85  There are two major
schools of thought on how to define identity: are people metaphysical
beings that exist prior to conduct or are people identified by their acts (i.e.
do people exist only because they act and are perceived)?86  To use
84. Tracy J. Davis, Opening the Doors of Immigration: Sexual Orientation and
Asylum in the United States, 6 HuM. RTs. BR. 19 (1999).
85. Various philosophers over the span of millennia have taken up the question of who
people are and what constitutes the soul. See generally, e.g., ARISTOTLE, DE ANIMA (Hugh
Lawson-Tancred trans., Penguin Classics 1987) (discussing the souls of different living
things and their properties); ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS (Joe Sachs ed., Green Lion Press
2002) (investigating the nature of fundamental (primary) substances and of being); GEORGE
BERKELEY, THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS (Robert Merrihew Adams
ed., 1979) (1713) (analyzing the nature of physical substance and perception); ST.
AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO, CITY OF GOD XI (Henry Bettenson ed., Penguin Classics 2003) (stating,
similar to Descartes' later assertion regarding mind/body dualism, that "[i]f I am mistaken, I
am"); RENt DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY (1641) (separating the existence
of the mind from the body, which can be summarized by the famous assertion: "I think,
therefore I am"); CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ARABIC PHILOSOPHY 309-10 (Peter Adamson
et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2005) (discussing Avicenna's mind/body dualism
through his 'floating man' experiment, which is very similar to Descartes's cogito ergo sum
argument); JOHN LOCKE, Of Identity and Diversity, in AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING ch. XXVH (1689) (relating Locke's theory of personal identity and
substance); SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1949) ("One is not bom a woman, but
becomes a woman.").
86. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Personal Identity and Punishment, 70 B.U. L. REV.
395, 402-08 (describing "Reductionist" and "Nonreductionist" theories of personal identity).
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status/conduct binaries is to ignore the impossibility of answering this
chicken-and-egg type question and truly defining personal identity. Jurists
that impose their views regarding personal identity on an entire country by
invoking status/conduct binaries lack not only objective neutrality, but also
a substantive basis because there is no right answer-the binaries are
simply applied in a malleable fashion in order to reach the desired
87outcome. Application of an instrument that lacks objectivity and
substantive truth to deprive a large minority of their constitutional rights
calls into question the democratic principles of equality, fairness, and
justice.88 Queer theory's deconstruction of status/conduct and sex/gender
lends strength to this argument.
a. Judith Butler and the Destruction of Binaries
Formulated from the standpoint of heteronormativity, the law utilizes a
theory of sex, gender, and desire that goes something like this: People are
born with a sex (male (xy)/female (xx)) which in turn determines their
gender (masculinity/femininity, which is culturally defined) which further
determines their object of desire (sexual orientation). 89 At first glance this
looks simple: One's anatomical structure determines one's gender which in
turn determines one's object of desire (sexual orientation). Most would
equate this with some intuitive truth, like 2+2=4. 90 However, the equation's
flaw lies in its determinist premise, and abundant deviations burn holes into
the theory.91 In this vein, queer theorist Judith Butler deconstructs these
87. Immigration courts recognize homosexuality as immutable status to protect gays
seeking asylum. See Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990) (finding that
"homosexuality is an 'immutable' characteristic").
88. Professor Schacter invokes other democratic principles as bases for deciding cases
and justifying legal outcomes. See Jane Schacter, Vision and Revision: Exploring the
History, Evolution, and the Future of the Fourteenth Amendment: Lawrence v. Texas and
the Fourteenth Amendment's Democratic Aspirations, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv.
733, 734 (2004) (discussing the use of principles of democracy-i.e. equality, liberty, and
citizenship-in deciding Lawrence v. Texas).
89. For the sake of simplicity: sex -- gender -- sexual orientation (desire).
90. See BuTLER, supra note 57, at 8 ("On some accounts, the notion that gender is
constructed suggests a certain determinism of gender meanings inscribed on anatomically
differentiated bodies, where those bodies are understood as passive recipients of an
inexorable cultural law.").
91. See id. at 6 (discussing the sex/gender distinction as originally an argument against
the "biology is destiny" formulation of sex and gender, which posits that "whatever
biological intractability sex appears to have, gender is culturally constructed: hence, gender
is neither the causal result of sex nor as seemingly fixed as sex").
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notions of sex, gender, and desire to reveal the problems inherent in this
binary system.
92
Butler's argument consists of three main steps. First, sex does not
cause gender; gender causes sex.93  Butler calls into question the
immutability of sex and argues that both gender and sex are socially
constructed.94 In "becoming" women, people are compelled by society, and
not by pre-sexed bodies, to abide by cultural norms regarding how to act in
accordance with some physical feature.95 No a priori physical substance or
body exists that forces people to assume a specific gender.96  People
"choose"-and I use the term "choose" loosely-a gender role and then
perform/imitate societal norms to construct that gender.97 The body never
is anything prior to becoming gendered, and no sex exists until the agent
performs its gender: "'[P]ersons' only become intelligible through
becoming gendered.
9 8
Second, Butler argues that gender is performative; in other words, she
argues gender is conduct.99  Philosophically speaking, Butler rejects
92. See infra note 93-118 (discussing Judith Butler's deconstruction of the sex/gender
binary).
93. Gender -- Sex. By flipping the arrow, identity/status takes form only after
performance/conduct defines it. "There is no gender identity behind the expressions of
gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very 'expressions' that are said to
be its results." BUTLER, supra note 57, at 25.
94. See id. at 8 (discussing Simone de Beauvoir's theory that a cogito or agent exists
which "becomes" gendered through cultural compulsion). Butler posits the notion that if a
sex-less body exists which takes on a gender, then for that body to construct its gender it
must have always have been interpreted by cultural meanings, and by definition, that would
be a social construct that is part of gender:
Beauvoir is clear that one 'becomes' a woman, but always under a cultural
compulsion .... And clearly, the compulsion does not come from 'sex.' If 'the
body is a situation,' as [Beauvoir] claims, there is no recourse to a body that has
not always already been interpreted by cultural meanings; hence, sex could not
qualify as a prediscursive anatomical facility. Indeed, sex, by definition, will be
shown to have been gender all along.
id. at 8 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
95. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
96. Id.
97. See BUTLER, supra note 57, at 8 (discussing the meaning of "construction" and
suggesting that it is not as simple as "choice").
98. Id. at 16. This parallels Standpoint B later discussed in Part IL.B.1, i.e. the "fluid"
standpoint.
99. See id. at 24-25 ("[G]ender is not a noun, but neither is it a set of free-floating
attributes, for ... the substantive effect of gender is performatively produced and compelled
by the regulatory practices of gender coherence [sexual expression].").
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Cartesian mind/body dualism. '0 In that vein, Butler makes her third move:
"[Slex, by definition, [is] nothing but gender all along."10' By rejecting the
mind/body distinction she rejects the idea of a "being" or a "substance"
before conduct or performance. Identity becomes like a "'grin [that]
hang[s] about without the cat.' ',10 2 Thus, gender performance creates or
defines sexual identity, but in creating that identity, gender performance
becomes that identity. 0 3 Because gender equals identity, sex drops out of
the equation, and gender simply is all there is and ever was.
More generally, Butler theorizes that no identity exists before conduct:
The masculine/feminine binary constitutes not only the exclusive
framework in which that specificity can be recognized, but in every
other way the 'specificity' of the feminine is... separated off
analytically and politically from the constitution of class, race, ethnicity,
and other axes of power relations that both constitute "identity" and
make the singular notion of identity a misnomer. 104
Identity equals the myriad ways in which people express themselves,
for example, by what they eat (vegetarianism), by what they wear (suits vs.
cowboy boots), with whom they sleep, etc.'0 5 Sexual orientation provides
just another piece of constitutive performance.
The relevance of Butler's philosophy when transplanted into the law
proves difficult to see at first. It seems unthinkable that the deterioration of
the sex/gender binary, being so purely a philosophical theory, might work
its way into the law, but indeed it has. Butler's model can be seen most
prominently and successfully deployed in the area of Title VII litigation.
106
100. See id. at 12 ("Despite my own previous efforts to argue the contrary, it appears
that Beauvoir maintains the mind/body dualism .... ). Butler rejects mind/body dualism
when she rejects the notion that there is some pre-sexed body that determines identity; Butler
believes that performance creates one's identity. See id. at 136 ("[Tlhat the gendered body is
performative suggests that it has no ontological status apart from the various acts which
constitute its reality.").
101. Id. at 8.
102. Id. at 32.
103. See id. at 141 ("If gender attributes, however, are not expressive but performative,
then these attributes effectively constitute the identity they are said to express or reveal.").
104. ld. at4.
105. See id. at 136 ("[A]cts and gestures, articulated and enacted desires, create the
illusion of an interior and organizing gender core .... ").
106. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006) (stating that
employers may not discriminate on the basis of sex). Note that I am using "successful" to
mean that the courts have deployed Butler's theory of sex and gender and collapsed the
sex/gender binary.
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In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,0 7 Ann Hopkins brought a Title VII claim
for sex discrimination after her employer refused to consider her candidacy
for partner. She claimed her company denied her a promotion on the basis
of sex, alleging that partners at her company told her she was too
aggressive, called her "macho," and told her to go to "charm school.''
0 8
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in favor
of Hopkins stating that Price Waterhouse was "influenced by sex
stereotyping" and had discriminated against her because of her sex.1°9
More importantly, and in support of Butler's theory, Ms. Hopkins won
her case not because Price Waterhouse discriminated against her on account
of being a woman, but for how she performed being a woman, that is, her
gender." 0  The Court stated that Title VII makes the "momentous
announcement that sex, race, religion, and national origin are not relevant to
the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees.""' When
speaking about Title VII, however, the Court completely collapses the
sex/gender binary: "Congress' intent to forbid employers to take gender
into account in making employment decisions appears on the face of the
statute."' 12  Throughout the entire opinion the Court talks about the
discrimination in terms of gender, using "sex" and "gender"
interchangeably.11 3 For example, the Court stated:
107. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (stating that, as a test
for sex discrimination under Title VH, an employer may avoid liability by showing that the
employer would have taken the same action had gender been ignored).
108. Id. at 235.
109. See id. at 250 ("In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts
on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted
on the basis of gender.").
110. See id. at 272 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117
(D.C. Cir. 1985)) ("[H]er 'professional' problems would be solved if she would 'walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."').
111. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S at 239.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. The Author recognizes the interchangeability of "sex" and "gender" in colloquial
English. As stated earlier, the Author takes the view that the careless collapse both in
common language and by the Court indicates the reflexiveness of collapsing sex and gender,
and that the two concepts really are so intertwined that they are nearly indistinguishable. A
discussion of the difference between "sex" and "gender" and the need to keep the two terms
separate in the language of the law, a movement advocated by Justice Scalia and Richard
Epstein can be found in an article by Mary Anne C. Case. See Mary Anne C. Case,
Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law
and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1995) (discussing the difference between
"sex" and "gender" and the recognition by Justice Scalia of the need to keep the two terms
separate).
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[Wihen a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played a
motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a
finding of liability only by proving ... it would have made the same
decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff s gender into account.114
International courts also recognize the inextricability of sex and
gender, or more broadly, status and conduct. In Attorney General v.
Dow,15 the Court of Appeal of Botswana held that discrimination based on
sex was proscribed by the Botswanean Constitution." 6 In Kanane v. State
of Botswana,'"7 the High Court of Botswana discussed the decision in
Attorney General v. Dow in which "sex," although not included in the
proscribed forms of discrimination listed in Section 15(3) of the
Botswanean Constitution, was deemed a proscribed form of discrimination.
In speaking about Attorney General v. Dow, the Kanane court used "sex"
and "gender" interchangeably: "The [Dow] Court therefore held that
discriminatory legislation on the basis of gender, even though not expressly
mentioned in Section 15(3) [of the Constitution], would be in violation of
Section 3 of the Constitution. ' 18 Thus even in Botswana, courts collapse
sex (status) and gender (conduct) echoing Butler's theory.
b. The Consequences for Sexual Orientation After Sex and Gender Get
Collapsed and the Emergence of a New Binary
Although American courts collapse sex and gender and extend legal
protection to gender, they have not done the same for sexual orientation."
9
114. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (emphasis added).
115. See Att'y Gen. v. Dow, 1992 B.L.R. 119, 122 (C.A.) (holding that the Citizenship
Act violated the Botswanean Constitution because it discriminated against women based on
their sex). Respondent, a citizen of Botswana married to an American citizen, challenged
two provisions of the Citizenship Act that prevented her children bom in wedlock from
becoming citizens of Bostwana. Id. at 121. Specifically, Respondent argued that the
provisions violated Section 3 of the Constitution conferring fundamental rights and freedoms
on the individual, Section 14 protecting freedom of movement, and Section 15 protecting
citizens from discrimination. Id. at 122. In so holding, the court found that sex
discrimination, although unenumerated, was a protected form of discrimination. Id. at 122.
116. See id. at 122 ("The omission of the word 'sex' from the word 'discriminatory' [in
Section 15 of the Botswanean Constitution] was neither intentional nor made with the object
of excluding sex-based discrimination.").
117. See Kanane v. Botswana, 1995 B.L.R. 94 (H. Ct.) (upholding laws that makes it
illegal to engage in homosexual activity because they do not discriminate on the basis of
sex).
118. Id. (quoting Attorney-General v. Dow, 1992 B.L.R. 119 (C.A.)) (emphasis added).
119. See, e.g., infra notes 120-126 and accompanying text (discussing the Second
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Sexual orientation, however, constitutes just another component of gender
and identity. In Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 120 Dawson, a lesbian,
brought a Title VII claim against her former employer for discriminating
against her based on her sexual orientation.12' Dawson referred to herself
as a "dyke" and was openly gay.122 Dawson alleged her coworkers and
supervisors told her she "wore her sexuality like a costume," 123 and claimed
she was fired for having a "dyke attitude."' 24 Dawson stated she was told to
"lact... less like a man and more like a woman" and that she "needed to
have sex with a man." 125 The Second Circuit held that Dawson could not
recover under Title VII because her claims "of sex stereotyping derive[d]
not from gender stereotypes but rather from stereotypes based on sexual
orientation., 126 Here the court again collapses the sex/gender distinction,
but makes a further distinction on the basis of sexual orientation.
The Botswanean court in Kanane v. State of Botswana upheld a law
that criminalized sodomy even though the court equated gender and sex
discrimination. 127  Similarly, in Banana v. State,128 a Zimbabwean court
upheld a law that prohibited sodomy between men, but not between men
and women. 129 The Banana Court held that the law prohibiting sodomy did
Circuit's refusal to extend protection from sex and gender discrimination to discrimination
based on sexual orientation).
120. See Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 224 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that
sexual orientation discrimination falls outside the purview of Title VII's protection against
sex and gender discrimination). Plaintiff brought a Title VII claim against her employer
alleging discrimination based on her sexual orientation. Id. The court affirmed dismissal of
the plaintiff's claims because there were no material issues of fact showing that the
defendant discriminated against her based on gender stereotypes. Id.
121. Id. at 224.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 215.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
127. See Kanane v. Botswana, 1995 B.L.R. 94 (H. Ct.) (upholding laws that makes it
illegal to engage in homosexual activity because the court found they did not discriminate on
the basis of sex).
128. 4 L.R.C. 621 (S.C.) (2000). Appellant was convicted on two counts of sodomy
and challenged the common law criminalizing sodomy for violating Section 23 of the
Zimbabwean Constitution, guaranteeing protection against gender discrimination. Id. at
621-22. The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe held that Section 23 of the Constitution did not
include an express prohibition against sexual orientation discrimination, but only a
prohibition against gender discrimination. Id. at 622. As a result, the law criminalizing
sodomy was not unconstitutional. Id.
129. See id. at 622 (upholding an anti-sodomy statute based on separate standards for
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not discriminate on the basis of gender, which would have been
unconstitutional, but discriminated on the constitutionally-permitted basis
of sexual orientation. 130 Like American courts, these courts collapse sex
and gender, but further prohibit homosexual conduct by differentiating
between gender and sexual orientation. The differentiation between gender
and sexual orientation gives rise to a new binary where non-sexual gender
performance is elevated to the level of status and sexual orientation is left
on the conduct side of the binary. This new binary may be represented as
(status and non-sexual conduct)/sexual conduct.
Any real difference between sexual orientation discrimination and
gender discrimination seems purely fictional, however.1 3' People frowned
upon Dawson's sexual relationships with women for the same reasons that
they frowned upon Hopkins' aggressive character-both constitute
deviations from the heterosexual hegemony's definition of "female."
Sleeping with someone of the same sex is a paradigmatic example of
deviation from gender stereotypes; after all, one of the most commonly
thought of attributes of the female gender is attraction to males.'
32
Discriminating against a person simply because they defy gender
stereotypes and norms embodies the very defimition of gender
discrimination, regardless of whether the deviation is sleeping with
someone of the same sex or being aggressive in the workplace.' 33  The
gender and sexual orientation discrimination).
130. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59-60 (1993) (analyzing the Hawaii
marriage statute under strict scrutiny because the application of Hawaii's marriage law, as a
restriction on same-sex marriage, constituted sex discrimination under Hawaii's
constitution). "What we have held is that, on its face and as applied, HRS §572-1 denies
same-sex couples access to the marital status and its concomitant rights and benefits, thus
implicating the equal protection clause of article I, section 5." Id. at 67. See also HAw.
CONST. art. I, sec. 5 (providing equal protection on the basis of sex); Amy Lovell, Comment,
"Other Students Always Used To Say, 'Look at the Dykes'": Protecting Students from Peer
Sexual Orientation Harassment, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 617, 639 (1998) (arguing "sexual
orientation discrimination is sex discrimination because the perpetrator is treating identically
situated individuals differently, solely based on the sex of the individuals and their
beloveds"). But see Theodore A. Schroeder, Fables of the Deconstruction: The Practical
Failures of Gay and Lesbian Theory in the Realm of Employment Discrimination, 6 AM. U.J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 333, 366 (1998) (arguing that sexual orientation discrimination
cannot be equated with sex discrimination and that Title VH must be amended before sexual
minorities can receive protection).
132. See Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REv.
353, 362 (2000) ("[T]o be a man or a woman in contemporary American society is in part
defined by one's sexual attractiveness to the opposite sex.").
133. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) ("In the specific
context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman
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United Nations Human Rights Committee recognized this in Toonen v.
Australia,134 where they held that: "The Committee confines itself to
noting... [that] the reference to 'sex' in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights is to be taken as including sexual orientation.
'1 35
Instead of recognizing that sexual orientation merely constitutes a part of
gender performance, however, courts draw an ephemeral line between
gender discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination and continue to
deny sexual minorities protection in Title VII cases.136
c. The Consequences for Binaries After Queer Theory Reveals There Is No
Real Difference Between Status and Conduct
The malleability of status/conduct exemplified in the breakdown of the
sex/gender binary indicates the dilemma one confronts when trying to
divorce status and conduct. It also indicates the impossibility of stamping
one prong of the binary immutable and the other mutable and thereafter
granting legal rights based on that determination. Due to malleability and
subjectivity, courts cannot apply binaries and offer promises of equality and
fairness with a straight face. Moreover, binaries can detrimentally affect
one's notion of personal identity. Because of the impossibility of
distinguishing between status and conduct, and the fundamental
constitutional rights at stake, courts should stop using binaries to justify
legal holdings in the sexual orientation context.
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.").
134. See Toonen v. Australia (Human Rights Committee Communication No.
488/1992) (Mar. 31 1994) (finding that two provisions of the Tasmanian criminal code that
criminalize consensual sex between adult males in private violate Article 17(1) of the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights protecting individual privacy rights).
Toonan argued that the law discriminated against homosexual men on the basis of their
sexual orientation. Id. The Committee recommended that the law be repealed. Id.
135. Id.
136. Cf. Schroeder, supra note 131, at 335 (discussing the reasoning courts have
employed to refuse to extend Title VII protection to sexual orientation). Schroeder
concludes that the majority of the reasons are "unfounded and that only a facial
interpretation of 'sex' remains as a viable reason for denying coverage under Title VII." Id.
at 336.
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B. "Standpoint Theory "-Courts Cannot Objectively Distinguish Between
Traits and Actions That Constitute Status and Those That Constitute
Conduct
Propriety carries with it connotations of objectivity. No reputable
scientist or mathematician would ever say that a study was proper if it
lacked objectivity. Moreover, no social science or history would be
accepted as fact if theorized or issued from a biased perspective. Modem
epistemology and notions of truth rest on foundations of objectivity. Legal
theory is no different-justice is supposed to be blind. This section will
apply "standpoint theory" to reveal hidden biases inherent in the legal
system that explain why courts fail to recognize homosexuality as status.
Article IH, Section 2 of the Constitution vests courts with the power to
decide all cases arising under United States laws. The judicial power
includes the power of judicial review and the power to interpret United
States laws.' 37 Courts do not have unlimited power in that they cannot
choose to ignore and to decide cases independent of the Constitution or
United States laws. Courts do, however, have wide discretion over
interpretation and over the stringency of judicial scrutiny to be applied.1
38
Take for example the Fourteenth Amendment, which states: "No state
shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." 139 Courts allow circumvention of equal protection when there is
a rational government interest in passing such a law. n° Within the power to
interpret the laws, the Court can choose to apply higher levels of judicial
scrutiny when the law in question discriminates on certain bases, such as
race and gender. No law or statute prevents a court from elevating sexual
minorities to suspect class status-this is completely within a court's
discretion. The United States Supreme Court has, however, repeatedly
applied rational basis review when analyzing cases dealing with sexual
minority rights.141 The failure to recognize sexual minorities as a suspect
137. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (announcing the principle of
judicial review in holding that it is for the judiciary to say "what the law is").
138. U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (explaining that
courts could apply a higher standard of judicial scrutiny).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
140. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (stating that no legitimate
state interest existed in passing Colorado's Amendment, which would have denied
homosexuals the right to ever be protected from discrimination).
141. See, e.g., id. at 639-40 (employing rational basis review to conclude that an
amendment that prohibited all legislative, executive, and judicial action protecting
homosexuals from discrimination in Colorado violated the Equal Protection clause);
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class rests on the reasoning that suspect groups should have immutable
characteristics for which they have historically been discriminated
against-homosexuality as mutable conduct fails that standard.
The conclusion that homosexuality is mutable conduct, however, has
not been reached from an unbiased perspective. Before proceeding, I ask
the reader now to recall the philosophical considerations in Part I regarding
the foundations of binary-reasoning in Socratic and Platonic philosophies.
1. Foundations for the Heteronormative Bias.
Now, let us assume for a moment that two different standpoints exist:
Standpoint A and Standpoint B. People who view the world from the
perspective of Standpoint A believe that things have discrete definitions and
objective truth exists-that some Form exists in another world which
represents the immutable truth. This belief in objective truth leads the
observer to believe that his definitions and truths enable him to place things
into discrete categories. Ren6 Descartes articulates this standpoint in his
philosophy of mind, when he separates mind and body, envisioning the two
as discrete complexes with their own worlds of accessibility and
function. 14 2  By separating mind and body, things can be regardless of
whether they ever engaged in any conduct; in other words, a mind can exist
independently of body 143 and 'Forms' exist in the heavenly sphere without
actually being perceived in the world.' 44 The modem use of the scientific
method reflects this standpoint: Scientists separate the specimen from its
natural environment, then isolate and study it in an artificial lab
environment where objective fact is supposedly derived. 1
45
Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (applying rational basis review to find Texas'
anti-sodomy statute unconstitutional).
142. See RENt DESCARTES, Meditation VI: Of the Existence of Material Things, and of
the Real Distinction Between the Mind and Body of Man, in THE MEDITATIONS AND
SELECTIONS FROM THE PRINCIPLES OF RENA DESCARTES 84, 85-86 (John Veitch, LL.D. trans.,
The Open Court Publishing Company 1927) (characterizing mind and body as distinct
entities).
143. See id. at 91 (stating that because man has "a clear and distinct idea" of himself as
a thinking thing and possesses "a distinct idea of [his] body" as an unthinking thing, it is
certain that the mind is distinct from the body and may exist independently).
144. See PLATO, Phaedo, in THE PORTABLE PLATO (Scott Buchanan ed., Benjamin
Jowett trans., The Viking Press 1948) 191, 202-03 (stating that concepts such as absolute
beauty and absolute good certainly exist, though they have never been perceived with the
human senses).
145. This critique of the modem scientific method can be seen in the writings of
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Standpoint B represents the opposite view: Truth is fluid, constantly
shifting with the observer, time, and external factors. Mind and body are
inseparable notions because they reflexively define each other. 
46
Categories fail because fixed definitions and objective truth do not exist.
Standpoint B can be seen in its most extreme form in George Berkeley's
empirical philosophy, in which Berkeley states: "To be is to be
perceived., 147 Things become actuated when they are perceived, when they
engage in conduct-e.g. minds cannot exist independently of bodies.148
Modern "standpoint theory" 149 reflects this theory, that there is no
separation between mind and body, proposing that knowledge should be
modem feminist philosophers. See generally, Sondra Farganis, Feminism and the
Reconstruction of Social Science, in GENDER/BODYKNOWLEDGE, FEMINIST
RECONSTRUCTIONS OF BEING AND KNOWING (Alison M. Jaggar & Susan R. Bordo eds.,
1989). Feminist philosophers identify the scientific method as the "Cartesian" model of
science. See id. at 207 ("The scientific method has come to be regarded as the vehicle
through which the mind, unencumbered by factors of class or status... can know or
understand.., objective reality. One must question the Cartesian ideal on which the
contemporary notion of science is based."). Modem feminist philosophers reject the
scientific method's idealistic assumption that objective reality exists, and instead seek
knowledge with the understanding that knowledge (both in content and form) is a social
construct, affected by one's environment, motivations for seeking knowledge, and gender.
See id. at 208 ("[B]oth the content and the form of thought, or the ideas and the processes
through which those ideas are generated and understood, are affected by concrete social
factors of which gender is one."). Moreover, modem feminist standpoint theorists take the
position that a theory of knowledge should take into account certain social constructs (e.g.,
who is the "knower," what knowledge is being sought, and why she wants to know this
thing). By critically understanding the role certain social constructs play in shaping human
"knowledge," that knowledge becomes more effective for the user. Id. This is called
"standpoint theory." For a general overview of standpoint theory, see Feminist Standpoint
Theory, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-epistemology/#standpoint (last visited
Dec. 18, 2008) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
146. See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 57, at 7 ("Gender ought not to be conceived merely
as the cultural inscription of meaning on a pregiven sex.., gender must also designate the
very apparatus of production whereby the sexes themselves are established.").
147. See GEORGE BERKELEY, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, in A NEW
THEORY OF VISION AND OTHER WRITINGS 113-14 (1969) (arguing that knowledge is gained
via perception, and that perception, and the subjectivities that accompany human perception,
create that knowledge and cause the object to be).
148. See id. at 114-15 (arguing that something cannot be described or understood in the
abstract, that human beings gain knowledge by perceiving things, and thus the subjectivities
of how the perception occurred forms that knowledge).
149. Feminist philosophy has established standpoint theory. See generally Sandra
Harding, Introduction: Standpoint Theory as a Site of Political, Philosophic, and Scientific
Debate, in THE FEMINIST STANDPOINT THEORY READER, INTELLECTUAL & POLITICAL
CONTROVERSIES 1-3 (Sandra Harding ed., 2004) (describing feminist standpoint theory and
its history).
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formed by taking into account the social constructs that shape it, and also
the subjectivities that arise between scientist and specimen. 150
Standpoint B will be referred to as the "fluid" standpoint because it
does not presuppose categories; rather, it fuses subjectivity with
epistemics.151  Judith Butler and George Berkeley's philosophy is
prominently reflected in this theory insofar as status and conduct cannot be
separated because conduct creates status; that is, conduct defines who one is
in the real world.
152
Standpoint A will be referred to as the "binary" standpoint because
binaries display clear symptoms of Standpoint A. Standpoint A is
predicated on a belief in the ability to categorize things as either status or
conduct. Inherent in that ability is the ability to distinguish between status
and conduct-that is, the ability to divorce personal identity from conduct.
This reflects elements of Cartesian methodology in that status and conduct
can be separated. 53 This standpoint also seems to derive its foundations
from elements of Socratic and Platonic epistemology, in its belief in
objective truth-e.g. immutable "Forms" that exist without actuation or
conduct in the world.
54
Ultimately, Standpoint A forms the foundation of modem
heteronormativity. Heteronormativity can be defined as the assumption that
heterosexuality is the normal or natural sexual orientation. 155
Heteronormativity posits the discrete categorization of individuals into
male/female and gay/straight categories. 56 Moreover, and this is where
150. See supra note 145 (discussing feminist standpoint theory as an epistemology that
takes into account the standpoint of the "knower" as opposed to modem scientific theory).
151. Feminist standpoint theory likewise fuses epistemics with socio-environmental
subjectivities. See supra note 145 (discussing standpoint theory generally).
152. For Judith Butler, there is no line between status and conduct. See supra note 104
and accompanying text. Moreover for Berkeley, status is tied up with action; thus nothing is
until it has been perceived. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 142-145.
154. Plato's immutable forms, because they exist objectively in an abstract world and
without regard to anything in the real world, support the notion that knowledge can be
garnered without understanding the world and its social constructs. See supra note 144.
155. Cathy J. Cohen further defines heteronormativity as "both those localized practices
and centralized institutions that legitimize and privilege heterosexuality and heterosexual
relationships as fundamental and 'natural' in society." Cathy J. Cohen, Punks, Bulldaggers,
and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer Politics?, 3 GLQ 443, 447 (1997).
156. The gay/straight distinction is a relatively new notion. See David Shneer & Caryn
Aviv, Bulldykes, Faggots, and Fairies, Oh My! Calling and Being Called Queer, in
AMERIcAN QUEER, Now AND THEN 1, 2-4 (2006) (discussing the emergence of the modem
category of "homosexual" and the changes in common terms used to refer to homosexuals).
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Socratic and Platonic philosophy play their largest roles, modem
heteronormativity reinforces heterosexuality as the single and natural sexual
orientation-i.e. the "Form" or true sexual orientation. As discussed in Part
I, and in Socratic terms: Homosexuality is the negative or lack of the true
Form of sexual orientation, heterosexuality. Homosexuality, as an absence
of truth or the true Form of what sexuality is, is not what people are-their
status; rather, it is mere conduct that deviates from what is right.
2. The Existence of Bias
If Standpoint A is the predominant view courts adopt, then
jurisprudence based on the above-mentioned heteronormative norms is
inherently biased because there is a predisposition to believe that status can
be separated from conduct, that heterosexuality is the true sexual
orientation, and that homosexuality reflects a deficiency and is conduct that
deviates from heterosexuality. If Standpoint B is the predominant view,
then courts would likely not invoke the status/conduct or sex and
gender/sexual orientation binaries at all. There would simply be no way to
divorce conduct from personal identity because conduct and status
reflexively define each other.
Which Standpoint has dominated? A simple look at the above-
mentioned case law and rationales points clearly to Standpoint A. The very
use of binaries suggests that courts believe they can separate status and
conduct. Moreover, the notion that homosexuality is deviant conduct has
persisted for decades. It seems heteronormative bias fixed the outcome
from the beginning.
157
157. For further proof that Standpoint A lends to the use of binaries, take for example
the case of religion. Religion, like sexual orientation, contains mixed components of status
and conduct. An observer from the perspective of Standpoint A would be willing to say that
a Muslim may believe in his religion, but he shall not pray five times a day; i.e. religious
conduct could be defined as mere conduct and thus capable of proscription. See, e.g.,
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990) (proscribing the religious use of
peyote); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605-07 (1961) (upholding a law that prevented
a Jewish storeowner from opening his store on Sunday thus indirectly forcing him to choose
between keeping his Sabbath or opening his store on Saturday to save his business);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879) (upholding a bigamy conviction
despite the Mormon practice of polygamy). An observer from Standpoint B would see the
impossibility of separating the conduct from the man's status; performing religious rituals is
a component that defines one's religious status.
Religion is different than sexuality, though, and is much more protected than
sexuality. Even from Standpoint A, religion does not have the weight of heteronormativity
pushing against it; rather, it has the United States' strong tradition of upholding religious
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C. Problems for the Immutable/Mutable Binary: Immutable Dispositions?
Is Conduct Really Mutable?
Beyond the impossibility of objectively categorizing homosexuality as
either status or conduct lies the problem of defining homosexuality as
mutable conduct. Consider the problems that bisexuality and philosophy
raise for the immutable/mutable binary.
1. Problems That Bisexuality Raises for the Immutable/Mutable Binary by
Showing That Desire Can Be an Immutable Disposition
a. Defining Sexuality in Terms of Desire
An examination of bisexuality exposes the problems of using an
immutability-based standard to grant groups legal rights. Bisexuality is an
especially interesting example because bisexuals have a mutable choice in
partner but an immutable bisexual orientation.
First, let us take a deeper look at bisexuality and suggest definitions.
Along with the modem creation of the heterosexual/homosexual dichotomy
came the creation of the intermediate category of bisexuality. Bisexuals are
commonly thought of as immature homosexuals transitioning into full
homosexuality, or as selfish individuals having their cake and eating it
too.158
Sexuality can be defined in many different ways depending on the
standpoint of the person doing the defining. In terms of optional
definitions, one can define sexuality in terms of conduct, desire, or both
conduct and desire. 159 For example, defining bisexuality based on conduct
freedom. These separate the case of the homosexual from the religious believer. The
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.
(RLUIPA), is a perfect example of the legislature respecting religious conduct as non-
divorceable from status. RLUIPA prohibits burdens on prisoners' free exercise of religion,
enabling prisoners to, for example, abide by religious dietary restrictions, and to pray. 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a). See also Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 127 (4th Cir. 2006)
(granting a Jewish prisoner ability to keep kosher diet).
158. RuTH COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER
AMERICAN LAW 21 (1996) (discussing the nicknames the gay and straight communities use
when talking about bisexuals such as "switch hitter" and "fence sitter"); Kenji Yoshino, The
Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REv. 353, 388-430 (2000) (discussing
the reasons behind the resistance of both the gay and straight communities in accepting
bisexuality as a "true" sexual orientation like heterosexuality and homosexuality).
159. See Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REv.
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alone would make anyone who engages in sexual conduct with persons of
both the same and opposite sex bisexual. In this case, a man in prison who
has sex with other men would be "bisexual" regardless of whether or not he
actually desired other men or whether his circumstances temporarily made
him engage in the conduct.
A definition of sexuality that takes into account conduct alone, as in
the above example, would be both under-inclusive-because some people
might cabin strong homosexual desires but choose not to, or never have the
opportunity to, act on their same-sex attraction-and over-inclusive-
because some people experiment with same-sex relationships or engage in
homosexual conduct only because of their current situation or inability to
engage in heterosexual conduct.16° A definition that takes into account both
conduct and desire would also be over and under-inclusive because it would
include those who have engaged in homosexual acts, but do not generally
desire same-sex partners, and exclude those that have the desire but never
acted upon it.' 6' For the sake of this Note, and to avoid under-inclusion, I
will define bisexuality in terms of desire for both male and female genders.
Although such a definition might be over-inclusive by including those who
have never engaged in homosexual conduct, at least it will capture those
with homosexual desire who are the focus of the remaining part of this
section.
162
353, 373-77 (2000) (discussing the various ways (desire, conduct, self-identification) one
can use to define or conceptualize bisexuality).
160. Id.
161. See id. at 372 (explaining the over and under-inclusive effects of using each axis-
desire, conduct, or self-identification-as a basis for categorizing people as bisexual).
162. See id. at 373 ("So which axis or combination of axes is best suited for our
purposes? I believe that the answer is a pure desire-based definition."). I choose this
definition of bisexuality for the same reasons as Professor Yoshino.
As Professor Yoshino explains, this desire-based definition may seem self-serving,
but this Note discusses the mutability of bisexual choice in the context of an immutable
orientation. Thus, those who have made the mutable choice of being with heterosexual
partners are just as important for this Note as those who have chosen to be with homosexual
partners. A desire-based definition of bisexuality best captures those two populations. See
id. at 373 (explaining that although "[a desire-based definition of bisexuality] may seem self-
serving as the desire-based definition is likely to yield more bisexuals than a conduct-based
or self-identification-based definition," ultimately the desire-based definition captures those
bisexuals who have been "erased," which was part of what the article aimed to show).
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b. The Bisexual Person's Choice May be Mutable, but the Desire that
Underlies the Ability to Make the Mutable Choice is Immutable Status.
The problem that bisexuality brings to the fore regarding
immutability/mutability-based theories is that it shows the impossibility of
defining even decisions, typically regarded as choices, as mutable.'
63
Conventionally, bisexuality seems to present the bisexual with a mutable
choice of picking a same-sex or cross-sex partner.' 64 After the bisexual
enters into a relationship, he or she is classified as heterosexual or
homosexual, depending on the sex of the chosen partner. 165 In one sense,
this view seems to support the idea that sexual orientation is mutable
conduct.
Given a desire-based definition of bisexuality, however, even after one
chooses to enter into a same-sex or cross-sex relationship, "either-sex"
desire is not simply erased, and thus, the sexual orientation persists as
immutable in this sense, despite protests to the contrary. 166 If a bisexual
woman enters into a relationship with a man, she is not made straight by
that one relationship if she still desires other women. 167 Regardless of the
gender of a bisexual's current partner, bisexual desire and choice remain
immutable characteristics of bisexual orientation.
168
163. See id. at 405 (indicating that immutability and bisexuality are not necessarily
inconsistent concepts).
164. See id. at 368-73 (discussing how the conventional view of bisexuality seems to
indicate that heteronormativity is presently entrenched in our ideas of sexual orientation-
many believe that people belong on one side of the heterosexual/homosexual dichotomy
alone, which further perpetuates the heteronormative position that only two sexual
orientations exist: heterosexual and homosexual).
165. See RUTH COLKER, BISExuALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER
AMERICAN LAW 23 (1996) (discussing criticisms by the gay and lesbian community when a
bisexual chooses a cross-sex partner)
166. See id. at 23 ("I was shocked and dismayed when a feminist activist referred to me
as a 'hasbian' after I married a man, thereby erasing my feelings toward and experiences
with women." (emphasis added)).
167. See generally COLKER, supra note 165, at 23-30 (refuting the erasure of
bisexuality after a partner is chosen).
168. See generally ALFRED KINSEY ET AL., SEXuAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE
637-59 (1948) (pointing out that there are many graduations of sexuality and that it is not
possible to categorize all people as exclusively heterosexual or homosexual as some are truly
both); ALFRED KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 468-69 (1953)
(discussing the reality of the existence of people who identify themselves as neither
exclusively heterosexual or homosexual).
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True bisexuals have no more choice in the people they desire than a
straight man in the women he desires. 69 Bisexuals cannot choose who they
are attracted to, and thus cannot choose to be straight or gay; a true bisexual
must live with genuinely desiring both genders. 70 This understanding of
bisexuality challenges the immutable/mutable binary by showing that
bisexual choice in the act of choosing is mutable, but the existence of the
choice itself is immutable. Essentially, bisexuality highlights the idea that
mutable choice itself can be categorized as immutable. Thus, this Note
suggests that the decision to characterize sexual orientation as mutable or
immutable becomes objectively incoherent.1
7'
2. Problems That Philosophy Raises for the Immutable/Mutable Binary
and the Theory That Conduct Is Mutable
Several philosophers would argue that no conduct is truly mutable. In
A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume sets forth a theory of the human
will that argues that one's actions are a necessary product of one's
disposition.172 The motives and passions that cause us to act are a product
of who one is: one's experiences, likes, dislikes, customs, and
circumstances. 73 If actions necessarily flow from who one is (one's
status), then Hume's theory really is a theory about the immutability of
conduct.
169. See generally ALFRED KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE,
supra note 168, at 637-59 (discussing the reality of the existence of those who experience
desire towards both sexes).
170. Id.
171. A simpler argument that can be made is that same-sex attraction is immutable
disposition, but bisexuality has an interesting way of highlighting the issue by showing that
bisexuals can have a choice in their conduct, which is thought of as mutable, but by
definition of being bisexual, the mutability of their conduct is actually immutable; i.e. their
mutability is immutable. For example, Mr. X, a bisexual insofar as he desires both males
and females, can choose which gender he will take as a partner. This supports the view that
sexual orientation is mutable conduct. But, that ability to choose, the foundation of that
choice, is a part of who Mr. X is and is inalienable to his disposition. In this sense, Mr. X's
sexuality, though conventionally thought of as mutable, is truly an immutable part of his
disposition.
172. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 257-62 (David Norton ed.,
Oxford Philosophical Texts 2000) (1739) (comparing the natural cause and effect of physical
occurrences and natural phenomena to the natural and inevitable cause and effect of our
surroundings upon our personalities and hence our actions).
173. Id.
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First, Hume notes that in natural law, certain bodies are predisposed to
move in certain ways, "'[t]is universally acknowledg'd, that the operations
of external bodies are necessary ... in their attraction, and mutual cohesion,
there are not the least traces of indifference of liberty."' 7 4 Subsequently,
Hume sets forth as axiomatic that "[1]ike causes produce like effects" and
moreover that just as the "the cohesion of the parts of matter arises from
natural and necessary principles... human society is founded on like
principles ... 17
In a second move, Hume rejects the doctrine of liberty as the
foundation of human action and instead argues that human action is a
product of necessity: "[N]ecessity makes an essential part of causation; and
consequently liberty, by removing necessity, removes also causes, and is
the very same thing [as] chance."'176 In conjunction with his first move,
these two amount to the idea that just as the movement of external bodies
are determined by the way they are shaped, for example, people's actions
174. Id. at 257.
175. Id. at 258. Hume also states:
There is a general course of nature in human actions, as well as in the operations
of the sun and climate. There are also characters peculiar to different nations
and particular persons, as well as common to mankind .... [T]his uniformity
forms the very essence of necessity."
Id. at 259.
176. Id. at 261-62. Hume locates and addresses three reasons why people hold onto
liberty as the grounding principle of human action. First, after one acts, it is difficult to
persuade oneself that it was "utterly impossible for us to have acted otherwise." Id. at 262.
Hume argues that people reject the idea that our actions were done of necessity because
necessity implies force, which we do not feel when we act. Id. Hume distinguishes between
two types of liberty in action: liberty of spontaneity and liberty of indifference. Id.
(emphasis added). He argues that people confound the two, when what they really feel is the
former. Id.
Second, and connected to the first, people experience the "false sensation ... of
the liberty of indifference." Id. (emphasis added). That is, when one experiments with this
notion of liberty by acting in a different way than usual to refute the idea of necessity, one
can easily produce that different action. Id. Hume however points out that this proves
nothing because within the experiment, the new action is motivated by a different motive,
namely the desire to prove that we are free. Because the experimenter changes his motive,
he can act differently than if the original motive were in play. Id.
Third, people are scared to call conduct necessary because of the possible damage
that might have on religion or morality. Id. at 263. Hume turns the objection on its head and
argues that his theory about necessity and conduct is essential to religion and morality.
Hume explains that a person is most responsible for actions that proceed from character and
disposition, rather than chance or accident. Id. at 264. Without this idea of conduct that
flows from something innate within a person, there would be no way to find men culpable
for their actions: "'Tis only from the idea of necessity that a person acquires any merit or
demerit from his actions .... Id.
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are determined in accordance with their inner dispositions (including
character, temper, experience, and other qualities). Hume believes that all
conduct flows necessarily from inner disposition; to remove necessity
would make human action the product of chance and thus not blameworthy
as action from inner disposition would be. 177
In application, this Note acknowledges that the adoption of Hume's
view that conduct is necessary and immutable would lead to absurd results
in the legal setting: Courts would have to grant people legal protection on
the theory that their conduct is immutable, flowing from an immutable
disposition. No one would excuse a thief s conduct, however, on the basis
that the theft was immutable conduct arising out of the thief's irresistible
inner nature. Moreover, the argument that disposition is immutable and
determines conduct can easily be turned on its head; one could easily argue
that disposition itself is mutable.
My point is not that Hume's philosophy should be given place in U.S.
jurisprudence but rather to underscore the fact that the characterization of
conduct as mutable or as immutable is highly debatable and has in fact been
debated for centuries. Choosing to define status or conduct as such requires
an axiom, or accepted starting point, which in turn must be decided by a
standpoint on the issue, which in turn leads to the aforementioned problems
of bias and subjectivity. 178
V. Conclusion: Alternatives to Using Binaries
Ultimately, classifying conduct under either side of the
immutable/mutable binary creates unpleasant outcomes. First, philosophic
177. See id. at 257-62 (discussing the degree to which behavior is actually immutable).
Philosophers have espoused views about immutable conduct and notions of
predetermination. See generally ST. ANSELM OF CANTERBURY, De Libertate Arbitrii, in
THREE PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES: ON TRUTH, ON FREEDOM OF CHOICE, ON THE FALL OF THE
DEVIL (Thomas Williams ed., Hackett Publishing Company 2000) (espousing the view that
freedom is the limited power of keeping an upright will for its own sake, and that because
the ability to sin is not a component of that freedom, the inability to sin (in god and angels)
is not a lack of freedom); ST. ANSELM OF CANTERBURY, De Casu Diaboli, in THREE
PHILOSOPHICAL DIALOGUES: ON TRUTH, ON FREEDOM OF CHOICE, ON THE FALL OF THE DEvIL
(Thomas Williams ed., Hackett Publishing Company 2000) (describing the "fall" of humans
from grace as a loss of the will to do justice for its own sake, and thus a loss of the ability to
exercise freedom-insofar as Anselm's narrow definition of freedom is the ability to keep an
upright will for its own sake); G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION (1957) (investigating free will
and akrasia-that is, acting "against one's better judgment").
178. See supra Part 11I.B.2.
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and epistemic problems arise-for example, immigration and Article IH
courts take different views on the immutability of homosexuality-as do
concerns about the motivations underlying application of binaries, such as
using binaries selectively to justify desired outcomes.1 79 Major issues of
standpoint arise: Do the decisions about what is status and what is conduct
simply reflect and reinforce the heteronormative hegemony and counterpart
views? 80 Finally, problems regarding the incongruity between binaries as a
legal instrument and the real world arise.' 8' The disparity between the
black and white nature of the binary does not square with the world. This
breakdown is shown by conflicting conventional thought, science,
philosophy, and other legal authorities, including United States immigration
courts that accept status-based definitions of homosexuality. 82  These
conflicting views bring to mind Socrates' famous announcement about
knowledge: "All I know is that I know nothing."183 If something cannot be
known, then constitutionally protected rights should not be granted or
withheld based on the pretense of knowledge or biased assumptions. 1
84
This is not to say that courts should stop functioning until everything
they base their decisions on are clear fact, just that courts would do better if
they assessed problems dealing with discrimination, such as granting
minorities suspect class treatment, based on the democratic notions that
underlie our society: equality and fairness.185  Truly assessing problems
with these instruments of a "neutral social morality" would ultimately lead
to the best choices for the polity.
186
Regardless of what device courts choose, this Note suggests that the
key is neutrality, because from a biased standpoint, the application of even
179. See supra Part H.A (discussing the difference between the treatment of
homosexuality in Article HII courts versus immigration courts).
180. See supra Part II.B (discussing hidden biases in the legal system which negatively
affect the legal definitions of homosexuality).
181. See supra Part IH.C (using a discussion of bisexuality to underscore the fallibility
of the immutable/mutable conception in the legal system).
182. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (explaining that United States
immigration courts have recognized sexual orientation as immutable status in order to
provide homosexual individuals with asylum protection).
183. See DIOGENES LAERTIUS, THE LIVES AND OPINIONS OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS
(C.D. Yonge trans., George Bell & Sons 1891) (attributing the quote to Socrates).
184. See supra Part LII.B (arguing that courts cannot objectively distinguish between
traits and actions that constitute status and conduct).
185. See Schacter, supra note 88 (discussing the use of principles of democracy-i.e.
equality, liberty, and citizenship--in deciding Lawrence v. Texas).
186. Id. at 767.
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these neutral notions become skewed. Courts should not take partisan
politics, private or religious morality, or majority morality into account.
Courts should also not operate from a heteronormative standpoint and
create better results for heterosexuals. The founding of this country was
based on the idea of freedom from majoritarian control. 87 If courts allow
their decisions to be made according to the biases of majoritarian
standpoints, then that founding principle of freedom is utterly defeated.
188
Other courts have already abandoned the use of binaries to justify denying
sexual minorities rights, preferring instead to balance the interests of the
individual against the interests of the community. 189 In 2003, the European
Court of Human Rights in Van Kuck v. Germany'90 held that courts should
not impose "general assumptions as to male and female behaviour" or
"substitute[] its views on [the] most intimate feelings and experiences for
those of the applicant."'19 Perhaps it is time for the American judiciary to
find a neutral means for granting or denying rights to American citizens as
well.
187. See, e.g., id. at 740 ("The fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice .... ).
188. See supra Part HI.A.3 (questioning the correctness of a legal system which applies
majoritarian concepts to the determination of minority rights).
189. See Case C-13/94, P. v. S. & Cornwall County Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-02143
(holding that the Council was not allowed to dismiss P because of his proposed sex-change
operation because the Council directive 76/207/EEC forbade all discrimination on account
of sex in the workplace).
190. 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 51 (2003).
191. Id. at 81 (holding that a transsexual's healthcare insurance company was not
allowed to deny reimbursement for her sex-reassignment surgery because the ability to
define one's own sex is fundamental to the right of self-determination).

